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Abstract. The aim of the strategic analysis is to (simply) carry out the game [Str02]
between the implementing body and possible links to the existing market situation. We
are therefore playing a strategic game between us and the outside world [Owe13]. This
situation is most often associated with existing and potential threats, such as competition,
fashion trends, cost situation, marketing effectiveness, market demand, etc. However,
this does not exhaust all aspects resulting from the situation, as conditions conducive to
the implementation may also be taken into account, such as the possibility of cooperation,
favourable location, new forms of reaching the recipient, new legal solutions, etc. Generally
speaking, we can divide the set of conditions into assets and threats. Playing a strategic
game leads not only to the estimation of the game’s value but also points to the equilibrium
points (saddle points) [Hen00] and to the conditions of market stabilization [Car12]. We
therefore have two players (one zero-sum two-player game depending on the assumptions
made [Fle89]); one side is our assets and the other side is external threats. The strategies of
both players will be a combination of implementation, market and marketing parameters.
This will be described as an example in the introduction (chapter 1). The next chapters
(2 and 3) are proposals for estimating the effects of strategy selection, i.e. creating payoffs
for players. The final stage will be playing the game, the analysis of its results (chapters
3) and the summary (chapter 4).
Introduction
To describe the strategy, we will use the above mentioned parameters and codify their
designation for example as follows: competition (p1), trends (p2), costs (p3), marketing
(p4), sales (p5), other (p6).
The values of the parameters are defined in the following ranges: binary, total, real,
linguistic, etc. For example, 1 (the binary single) means the strength of an asset and a
weak threat. Value 0 (the binary zero) indicates potential weakening leading to a threat. In
coding of real numbers we can use percentages or negative fractional numbers in the range
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of [-1,1], etc. Values of the parameters used in the strategy structure allow to determine the
players payoffs for particular strategies. For example, for two assets A={p1, p2, p3, p4, p5,
p6}={1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0}, B={0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1} and three threats C={0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0}, D={1, 0,
1, 0, 1, 1}, E={1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1}, we create a game in the form of (Fig. 1):
Figure 1: 2x3 zero-sum game formal notation
From the exemplary assumption about a zero-sum game, we claim that the individual
payoffs will be as follows:
payoff(A-C)=(1-0)+(0-1)+(1-1)+(1-0)+(1-0)+(0-0)= 2,
payoff(A-D)=(1-1)+(0-0)+(1-1)+(1-0)+(1-1)+(0-1)= 0,
payoff(A-E)=(1-1)+(0-1)+(1-0)+(1-1)+(1-1)+(0-1)=-1,
payoff(B-C)=(0-0)+(1-1)+(1-1)+(0-0)+(1-0)+(1-0)= 2,
payoff(B-D)=(0-1)+(1-0)+(1-1)+(0-0)+(1-1)+(1-1)=-1,
payoff(B-C)=(0-1)+(1-1)+(1-0)+(0-1)+(1-1)+(1-1)=-2.
Real payoff data are shown in Fig 2.
Figure 2: 2x3 zero-sum game notation with real data
Parameters and payoffs are usually set with greater precision, for which both total and
real codes are suitable. They can be obtained on the basis of market research and marketing
situation [Kum13]. Instead of binary logic we can use multi-valued logic, for example three-
valued logic {1,0,1} or Lukasiewicz’s logic {0,1,2}. Another approach is to use interval and
fuzzy calculus [Cha13]. For example, subtraction (used in the above formula for estimation
of with drawls) on interval basis is carried out on interval variables as follows [?]:
[x]− [y] = [x−−
−
y,
−
x− y
−
], (0.1)
where: [x−,
−
x] - the lower and upper limits of variable x (variable interval limits [x]). In the
case when we use other payoff estimators we will use equally logically interpreted (in the
proposed source) actions, for example:
[x] + [y] = [x−+
y
−
,
−
x− −y],
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[x] ∗ [y] = [min{x− y−, x−
−
y,
−
x y
−
,
−
x
−
y},max{x− y−, x−
−
y,
−
x y
−
,
−
x
−
y}],
[x]/[y] = [x] ∗ (1/[y]),
1/[y] = O if [y] = [0, 0],
1/[y] = [1/
−
y, 1/ y
−
] if 0 /∈ [y],
1/[y] = [1/
−
y,∞[ if y
−
= 0 and
−
y > 0,
1/[y] =]−∞, 1/ −y] if y
−
< 0 and
−
y = 0,
1/[y] =]−∞,∞[ if y
−
< 0 and
−
y > 0, (0.2)
where: O - stands for a zero set.
The same applies when we use fuzzy variables for estimating payouts which in one of
the possible variants we can treat even as a set of - sections, i.e. intervals.
Probability calculus can be used in various ways to determine the level of payouts. We
can use Pawlak’s methodology [Paw85], [Paw82], Demster-Shafer’s methodology [Bey00],
Bayes’s determinants [Jos16], entropy estimation [Gra11], stochastic structures, etc. The
choice depends on the situation and adequacy conditions and clarity of their description.
1. Probabilistic estimation of payoffs in relation to assets and threats
On the basis of market research and forecasting analyses, we determine the probability of
threats at any time. It is a set of probabilities which in total do not give unity because
each of them is completed to unity only for the situation when the threat does not occur
pp (X) + pp (X) = 1; X ∈ {C,D,E} and thus∑
X∈{C,D,E}
pp (X) 6= 1 - Exemplary data for the market launch of VR glasses and those
related to competition threats are as follows (Fig. 3):
After the normalization, we obtain the relative values of probabilities of occurrence
of threats related to strategies C, D and E for 1 and 10 months (Fig. 4). Figures 3 or
4 can be used to assess payouts for strategic games every month. Payouts relating to
assets should be estimated similarly. A created game may have a zero sum (as shown
in the example in Fig. 1.) or not if having distributed the payouts from threats and
assets [Mye97], [Goe99]. The value of a game is valued due to monthly playing. If it is
positive then we gain and the situation is beneficial to us, making the process of marketing
a product profitable, if the value of the game is negative then we should change the strategy
or withdraw from a project. If the data from Fig. 1 (or 2) are inaccessible to us we must
estimate them ourselves and return to the parameters of strategy development (p1,...., pn)
and their probabilistic features, i.e. for example the probability of competition impact,
effectiveness of marketing, level of marketability of goods, possibilities of cost reduction,
etc. The paper [Gei16] presents the method of estimating payouts based on the evaluation
of benefits in the strategy with the help of the entropy formula. In such an algorithm we
use a standardized structure of probabilities corresponding to parameters p1,.... pn.
In the game presented in the first chapter (Fig. 2), row A dominates over row B, and
column E dominates over columns C and D. Solution of the game (game value) appears
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Figure 3: Distribution of probability for threats {C, D, E} within 10 months
Figure 4: Effect of standardization of threat probabilities for the first and last month after
the product has been placed on the market
at the cross-roads of row A and column E, and it is negative. This indicates that it is
not economically viable to place the product on the market (or another implementation
described in the same way). However, let us note that our strategic analysis is not accurate;
it is based on a binary range. What will happen when we make our description more precise
using a deterministic notation with the help of numbers, e.g. real numbers. Appropriate
strategies will be as follows:
A={0.88; 0.24; 0.52; 0.91; 0.71; 0.02}, instead of A={1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0},
B={0.32; 0.68; 0.53; 0.14; 0.06; 0.77}, instead of B={0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1},
C={0.05; 0.61; 0.53; 0.12; 0.08; 0.30}, instead of C={0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0},
D={0.81; 0.11; 0.50; 0.22; 0.72; 0.84}, instead of D={1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1},
E={0.67; 0.72; 0.07; 0.55; 0.60; 0.53}, instead of E={1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1}.
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Therefore, we receive the payoff structure as shown in Fig. 5. Now also row A dominates
over row B. But column D dominates over columns C and E, giving a small plus (A-D =
0.08). This indicates the profitability of the project (but weak). The saddle point therefore
moves as shown in Fig. 3, so we wonder whether it is worthwhile to market the product.
Using the formula for the profit entropy (
∑−prob/cost log2 (prob) ; [Ney99]), we get the
structure of the game presented in Fig. 7.
Figure 5: 2x3 zero-sum game - notation with real data (on the principle of the use of
parametric data in real numbers)
The structure based on the entropy of profit indicates the dominance of row B over A
on a scale of one percent and column E over columns C and D on a scale not exceeding seven
percents. The game solution is located at the crossing of strategy B and E with a negative
result of -0.16. Finally, you can remove column C which in all cases was dominated, and
play the game for strategy {A, B}{D, E} (Fig. 8). If there were no dominated elements,
we analyze mixed strategies according to the methodology presented in [Str02]:
Figure 6: Saddle point movement comparison of binary and real principle - Fig. 2 and 5)
Let us add a new strategy X obtained for example by correcting the threats assessed
using the P6 parameters in strategies C and D (C={0.05; 0.61; 0.53; 0.12; 0.08; 0.40},
D={0.81; 0.11; 0.50; 0.22; 0.72; 0.68}) (Fig. 9). Row B and column C are again excluded as
dominated. Other elements of the game structure are not dominated, so we can use mixed
strategies (Fig. 10).
Figure 7: 2x3 zero-sum game - notation with real data (on the principle of the use of profit
entropy)
Game value:
if the column plays D: prob(A)*0.08+prob(X)*0.24=0.14
if the column plays E: prob(A)*0.14+prob(X)*0.14=0.14
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Figure 8: Reduction of the game structure by the dominated strategy C value of the game
is 0.08
In order to obtain the positive value of the game, we have introduced an additional
strategy X. This could be done by changing the values of strategic parameters p1,....,pn.
Obtaining an additional strategy is a form of combating threats and increasing the effec-
tiveness of our project. It should be remembered, however, that adjustment of strategic
parameters intended for marketing, for example, is an additional cost that we will certainly
incur.
2. Interval estimation of payoffs in relation to assets and threats
In some situations, it may be useful to perform interval analysis to examine the impact
of changes in strategic parameters on withdrawals, and especially on the value of a game.
Let’s get straight to interval payouts and look for effective withdrawal solutions in predefined
intervals.
Figure 9: 2x3 zero-sum game with new strategy X
By rejecting the dominated C column and using Solver to search for better solutions,
we get r the following payout structure (Fig. 12). By changing the boundaries of ranges we
can get tips on how to develop better strategies. For this to be reflected in reality, we need
to introduce these strategies into a real market situation, for example, adjust costs, change
locations, change the forms and effectiveness of the market, search for partners, etc. For
example, by reducing costs we can relatively increase the A-E payout from 0.17 to 0.2 which
leads to the solution of the game presented in Figure 13. In this case of cost parameter
the conclusion is trivial, but playing the game can determine the scale and trends of a
threat (in chronological terms). Thanks to a well described situation relating to our market
position, through proper definition and assessment of payoffs we can plan and forecast the
development of investments, implementations, cooperation, cost reduction and marketing
expenditures. Chronological research of the game value with threats by using and modifying
our own assets gives a chance to follow changes and trends in the economic situation and
to respond quickly to them. Thanks to a strategic game, which is played systematically
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Figure 10: Use of mixedUse of mixed strategies after adding the X row option. Solution of
the game with a mixed strategy
Figure 11: Interval payoff game
Figure 12: Searching for optimal solutions in predefined intervals
over time, we can see the predicted threats, and also, we can examine the effects of sudden
threats.
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Figure 13: Effect of the impact of cost changes on the game result (∆=0.167-0.152=0.015)
3. Conclusion
The proposed players’ layout is accordingly: assets threats in a strategic game used for
analysis of the market situation related to implementations, introduction of goods to the
market, investments, etc. It is therefore a game of us vs. the market situation. The
game should be played in time; it should be appropriate to corrections of our assets and
emerging threats. Only the zero-sum games have been described in the simplest possible
way. The payoffs were estimated on a deterministic and interval scale using probabilistically
estimated parameters. Therefore, a principle was proposed and also its application manner
for strategic market analysis as well as possibilities to increase the efficiency of planned
projects. The proposed principle development may include non-zero sum games.
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